LONDON, (Reuters): Many Western leaders view India as a critical counterbalance to China, with their concerns about the People’s Republic overshadowing worries about Narendra Modi’s authoritarian tendencies. As exit polls suggest Modi is on the verge of securing a third term, the United States and Europe may intensify their strategic partnership with India. However, the alignment of interests remains limited, and the divergence in values poses challenges for deeper cooperation.
During his second term, Modi enjoyed warm receptions in the West. In June, U.S. President Joe Biden hosted Modi for a state visit to Washington, marking a new era in U.S.-India relations with several defense and other agreements aimed at countering China’s global influence. Following this, French President Emmanuel Macron invited Modi as the guest of honor for the Bastille Day military parade, where they discussed potential deals for India to purchase French-made jets and submarines.
Western governments have promoted India as an alternative supplier of manufactured goods to reduce dependence on China. US Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen has described India as a key player in “friend-shoring,” a strategy to build supply chains with allied nations. Additionally, the United States, India, and other countries announced a multibillion-dollar infrastructure project to connect India to Europe via the Middle East. However, this project has been delayed due to Israel’s conflict with Gaza.
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Despite these positive developments, tensions persist. The US government has expressed concerns over Modi’s administration’s treatment of Muslims, independent media, and opposition politicians. Allegations of India’s involvement in plots against Sikh separatists in the U.S. and Canada have further strained relations. The Indian government has dismissed these criticisms as “misplaced” and “biased.”
The primary concern for US leaders is China’s potential aggression in East Asia, particularly towards Taiwan, the Philippines, Japan, and South Korea. India’s focus, however, is on its Himalayan border with China. New Delhi is unlikely to join any US-led campaign against China in East Asia, and the U.S. is not expected to directly support India in any conflict with China, though intelligence sharing could be beneficial.
The West can offer India military equipment, which may divert Chinese military resources from its eastern sea frontier to the Himalayas. This also presents an opportunity to reduce India’s dependence on Russian arms, given Russia’s growing alliance with China. However, India is unlikely to sever ties with Moscow due to lucrative deals on discounted Russian oil.
Western governments should exercise caution in supplying India with advanced military technology, considering the potential for India to develop its own systems independently.
While India is viewed as a potential alternative manufacturing hub to China, it is unlikely to fill this role extensively. Despite its rapid economic growth, India’s manufacturing sector remains underdeveloped compared to its services sector. Protectionist policies have limited its export capacity, and foreign direct investment remains relatively low.
There are other potential areas for cooperation, such as climate change. The West could assist India in accelerating its green transition by funding the closure of coal-fired power plants. However, Modi has shown limited interest in such deals.
Overall, while Western leaders see strategic value in partnering with India to counter China, the relationship is likely to remain complex and transactional, influenced by geography, economics, and geopolitics.
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